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Network Economics is a relatively new field of study that is emerging at the 
intersection of network theory and economics. Network theory is a growing field that 
attracts researchers from a variety of other fields including physics, sociology, and 
computer science. The cross-fertilization of ideas between network theory and 
economics is creating powerful, new analytic tools. Network theory is providing new 
ideas and new models to the mature field of economics as well as new results, and 
economics offers solutions to new problems that are arising in certain, real-world 
networks.  
The term network economics has several possible meanings. At times it has been 
applied to economic problems that include a significant network externality, which is a 
component of demand that changes in response to others’ consumption of a particular 
good. Network economics can also mean the study of economic problems in the context 
of network models. In this paper, the definition of network economics will be liberally 
expanded to refer to what might properly be called network theory economics–the 
interdisciplinary study of how principles of network theory and economics interact. 
Although this is not yet a unified field, this paper will demonstrate how network theory 
and economics relate to each other and it will present practical examples that display 
the power of network economic theory. 
The reader only needs basic familiarity with microeconomics, game theory, and 
simple math. Section 2 will present a brief discussion of network theory that is a 
suitable introduction to the uninitiated, with some comments on issues of complexity 
theory and its relevance to the current topic. Readers who are already familiar with 
these topics can easily skip this section. Sections 3-6 will present several case studies 




that highlight various applications of network economics. Section 7 will conclude with a 
discussion of the important themes and future direction of network economics. 
 
II. A Primer In Network Theory 
 Network theory is a relatively new science, but it is built on the foundation of 
graph theory, a branch of mathematics that originates from the work of Leonard Euler 
in the 18th century. A graph is a mathematical description of a system of interconnected 
objects; graph theory has nothing to do with histograms, bar charts, or scatter plots. 
Graph theory has been studied intensively and is understood very well, with various 
practical applications in computer science, physics, and even cartography. The two 
fields are closely related, and in this paper the terms network and graph will be used 
interchangeably. 
 In order to be well defined, a network must have two specifications. First, a set of 
vertices must be specified. These vertices can represent any kind of objects, such as 
people, network routers, economic markets, etc. Second, a set of edges must be specified. 
Edges associate one vertex with another vertex and indicate some kind of relationship 
between the two. This definition of a network is exceedingly generic so that network 
theory can be applied to as wide a range of systems as possible. 





Figure 1: A friendship network. 
 
Networks can be defined in any number of ways. In a social context, each vertex 
could represent a person and an edge would exist between two people if and only if 
they are good friends. In a different social network definition, an edge might indicate 
mere acquaintanceship. Or the vertices of a network could represent the boards of 
Fortune 500 corporations, and an edge exists between two boards if and only if one or 
more board members sit on both boards. Clearly, the properties of any particular 
network depend intimately on how the network is defined. Therefore, precise 
definitions are always mandatory.  
To clarify this point, an example network is presented in Figure 1. This is a 
friendship network. Each vertex in this network is a person, and an edge exists between 
two people if and only if those two people are friends. Therefore, the network stores 
information about relationships among these people. Just by looking at the diagram it is 
easily inferred that John is friends with David but not Beth. John is, however, indirectly 
connected to Beth by sharing a mutual friend named Cindy.  




Notice that this diagram is only a visual representation of the network. Strictly 
speaking, a network is only an abstract entity defined by its set of vertices and set of 
edges, but visualizing the network often aids analysis. In this paper, network diagrams 
will be referred to simply as networks, but the distinction between the two terms is 
important because any particular network could be drawn in an infinite number of 
different ways. Figure 2 shows two layouts of the same network. In this case, the 
network represents a metro transit system. Each vertex is a station in the transit 
network, and two stations have an edge between them only if a metro rail directly 
connects those two stations. The two different diagrams represent the same network, 
yet seeing either layout in isolation might lead to different conclusions about the 
network. The diagram on the left suggests a hierarchy, whereas the diagram on the 
right resembles an actual metro rail map. Therefore, it is important to be aware of the 
difference between the abstract network and its visual representations. 





Figure 2: Two different visualizations of the same network. 
 
Networks possess a number of interesting, measurable properties that are 
important for comparing and classifying various types of networks. The degree of a 
vertex is equal to the number of edges that are attached to that vertex. In the metro rail 
network presented above Five Points has a degree equal to four, and Lenox has a 
degree equal to one. The degree distribution of a network is a histogram of the degrees of 
all vertices. The distance between two vertices is equal to the number of edges on the 
shortest path that connects those two vertices. The distance between College Park and 
Buckhead is four. The diameter of a network can be measured in several ways. In some 
applications, the diameter is defined as the worst-case path length, i.e. the maximum 
shortest path between any pair of vertices in the graph. For this paper, though, the 
diameter is defined as the average path-length, i.e. the average over all pairs of nodes of 
the shortest path between each pair.  




The network is connected if a path exists between every pair of vertices. The 
metro rail network is connected, because any station can be reached from any other 
station. The edge density is equal to the number of edges in the network divided by the 
maximum possible number of edges that could exist in the network. In the metro rail 
network, there are thirteen edges, but the network could have as many as ninety-one 
edges in it, so the edge density is 13/91, which is roughly .14. A network is complete if 
every pair of vertices is directly connected by an edge; a complete network has an edge 
density of 1.0 by definition. The metro rail network is not complete, because there are 
obviously many pairs of vertices which are not directly connected. Finally, a network 
can be characterized by its clustering coefficient, a measure of the extent to which vertices 
are organized into distinct neighborhoods. The clustering coefficient will be formalized 
in Section 6. There are of course a number of other important properties, but those 
defined above are the most pertinent to this paper.  
Networks can be configured in any variety of ways: small diameter, large 
diameter, low clustering, high clustering, etc. Network theorists have discovered, 
however, that many classes of networks share similar characteristics. In this paper, the 
primary interest is in so-called small world networks. This class of networks is typically 
defined by three properties: small diameter, high clustering, and heavy-tailed degree 
distribution. In many cases, small world networks also share the common characteristic 
that they formed spontaneously and without centralized control. 
Researchers have discovered and documented countless examples of networks 
that fit this description, including most social networks, many economic networks, the 
World Wide Web, the national power grid, and even the neural network in the brain of 
the worm C. Elegans (Watts, 95-98). These networks take their name from the universal 
anecdote in which two strangers discover that they have a mutual friend and remark on 




a what a “small world” it is. Stanley Milgram, a noted sociologist, made the term 
famous in a 1967 paper in which he estimated the diameter of the global 
acquaintanceship network to be roughly six, which in turn spawned the phrase “six 
degrees of separation” and acquaintanceship games such as “Six Degrees Of Kevin 
Bacon”. 
Milgram’s experiment has been criticized for lack of rigor and small sample size. 
Consequently, his estimate of the diameter of the global acquaintanceship network is 
certainly questionable. Whatever the exact number is, though, the lesson remains the 
same: in a network with as many nodes as there are people on the earth – 3.6 billion in 
1967 (United Nations) – the average shortest path between any two people is amazingly 
small, perhaps less than or equal to ten. 
Bipartite networks will also be important in this paper. A bipartite network is 
characterized by having two different types of nodes, and edges that only exist between 
vertices of different types. As an example, some research has been performed on 
romantic relationship networks. Assuming only heterosexual relationships, these 
networks must be bipartite because the vertices can be divided into two types (male and 
female), and edges only exist between males and females. No edge connects one male to 
another male or one female to another female. 
Before proceeding, it will be helpful to comment briefly on the role that 
complexity plays in network theory. Complexity theory is a field between math and 
computer science that studies the computational resources needed to solve problems 
algorithmically. Nearly all algorithms, independent of the hardware resources 
available, will vary in running time as the size of their input varies. Table 1 
demonstrates how various types of algorithms scale with the input size. Linear 
algorithms scale in direct proportion to the size of the input. If the size of the input 




doubles, the running time doubles as well. A quadratic algorithm scales in proportion 
to the square of the input size, so doubling the input size quadruples the running time, 
because 
€ 
22 is  4. The exponential function grows the fastest, however. Increasing the 
input size by a factor of ten increases the running time by a factor of 1024, because 
€ 




algorithm: 1 input bits 2 input bits 3 input bits 10 input bits 
Linear 1 second 2 seconds 3 seconds 10 seconds 
Quadratic 1 second 4 seconds 9 seconds 100 seconds 
Exponential 1 second 4 seconds 8 seconds 1024 seconds 
Table 1: Various types of algorithms and hypothetical running times. 
 
The difference between polynomial and exponential running time is quite 
striking. An exponential algorithm might be faster than a polynomial algorithm for 
small inputs, but the running time explodes as the input gets larger. Consider simply 
that 500^2 is only 250,000, but 2^500 is about 3.3 x 10^150, a number so large that it 
makes the number of nanoseconds since the big bang (4.7 x 10^26) seem miniscule and 
dwarfs even the largest estimates of the number of subatomic particles in the universe 
(10^128) (Yolkowski). If a calculation’s best-known algorithmic solution is exponential, 
it becomes an intractable problem for all but the smallest inputs. Even with computers 
billions of times more powerful than those that exist today, these calculations will still 
be impossibly time consuming. 
The difference between these two kinds of algorithms is important in network 
theory because it makes some calculations difficult to do on large networks. There are 
reasonably fast algorithms for many basic calculations such as diameter and clustering. 




The running time of Floyd’s algorithm, which is used in this paper to calculate the 
diameter of a global trade network, is proportional to the cube of the number of 
vertices. This means that if the algorithm requires one second to compute the diameter 
of  a network with a hundred vertices, it will require eight seconds to run on a network 
with two hundred vertices, because two raised to the third power is eight. Thus, 
doubling the size of the network increases the running time by a factor of eight. (Note 
that on modern computers, Floyd’s algorithm actually runs much faster – well under 
one millisecond for moderately sized networks.) If the above is confusing, the most 
important point to remember is that many network theoretic algorithms run in 
exponential time, and so only approximated solutions are feasible. An example of an 
exponential algorithms in network economics will be touched on in Section 5. 
  
III. Spam Email  
 Every person on the planet who has an Internet email account knows what spam 
is: high-volume, unsolicited email that clogs inboxes with various scams, pornography, 
and product pitches. While spam is obviously irritating, it is also becoming a waste of 
resources. In 2003, Andrew Leung estimated that spam comprised 40% of all email (3). 
He also noted that the problem was growing rapidly: Earthlink reported a 500% 
increase in the volume of spam email over an 18-month period. In 2002, U.S. 
corporations are estimated to have spent $8.9 billion combatting spam. The huge 
volume of spam on the Internet pushes up bandwidth, server storage and support staff 
costs, costing U.S. corporations $3.7 billion. The lost productivity of workers, who 
spend several seconds handling each spam message, adds up to another $4 billion. In 
addition to the economic costs, Leung notes that home users also waste time and money 




fighting spam and they experience a “psychological effect comparable to having [their] 
home broken into” (9). 
 Although spam might appear to be an ineffective means of marketing, it is 
actually (and unfortunately) very economically sound. A spam advertiser has very low 
fixed costs. The essential tools include a personal computer, a broadband internet 
service provider (ISP), and a database of emails. The marginal costs, however, are 
virtually non-existent. The cost of sending a single email is virtually the same as the cost 
of sending a million. In traditional industries, firms operate whenever marginal 
revenues exceed marginal costs.  
Email based spam, however, is not yet at economic equilibrium, primarily 
because the first factor – the cost of sending spam – is more or less non-
existent in the email world. (Osterman) 
 
Marginal revenues, on the other hand, are significant. A very small positive response 
rate to a spam campaign will cover costs and turn a profit. 
Response rates to bulk commercial email are thought to be as low as 
.005%. That means the typical message appeals to 50 people and annoys 
999,950…Marketers now pay $150 for a compact disk with 70 million 
email addresses – or 3,500 new customers…And here’s the really 
troubling development: the economics of spam are only getting worse 
from a public standpoint. Thanks to aggressive new techniques for 
harvesting email accounts, the cost of hooking new customers is 
constantly plummeting. (France) 
 
In principal, the problem with spam email is that spam advertisers pay ultra-low 
marginal cost but their actions produce a negative externality. This is similar to a free-
rider problem, and the only answer is to make spam advertisers internalize the social 
and economic costs of their actions. There are a variety of legal and technological 
approaches to achieving this end; most of the strategies employed so far have found 
limited success. As anti-spam measures improve, spam advertisers improve their tactics 
as well. 




 Most ISPs have used several tactics to curtail spam. They have secured mail 
servers by requiring user authentication and closed down open relays (servers which 
forward mail blindly). They have also terminated accounts that were used to send 
spam. In addition, ISPs have set up databases known as DNS-based black hole lists 
(DNSBLs)i to track the IP addresses of third party open relay servers and known spam 
advertisers. If an ISP is suspected of allowing or supporting spam advertising, their 
entire subnet (the range of IP addresses which they manage) might be blackholed 
(Leung) – a death knell for an ISP and a good local incentive to promote the globally 
desired outcome. 
Despite the efficacy of these cost internalization regimes, spam advertisers have 
continued and spam email is still growing. Spam advertisers exploit competition 
between ISPs by opening new accounts frequently and thus evade being permanently 
blackholed. They have also brought freedom of speech lawsuits against organizations 
that maintain DNSBLs and used other means of legal intimidation to shut down or 
cripple the ISPs’ anti-spam measures. 
 Governmental response has been slow and ineffective. Part of the problem can be 
attributed to bureaucratic confusion and delay. But there is also a fundamental dilemma 
in enacting anti-spam legislation: there is no precedent for protecting consumers from 
advertising (Leung). Legislation enacted thus far deals only with spam email that 
contains inappropriate material or misleading sales information. The fact that some 
readers do respond positively to spam email legitimates the claim that spam is speech 
protected in the U.S. by the Bill of Rights. Even in the cases where spam is legally 
prohibited, spam advertisers can dodge the law by operating in foreign countries 
(France). 




 The mediocre performance of black hole lists and legal intervention has left a 
vacuum in the effort to reduce spam. To date, the most successful means of increasing 
spam advertisers’ costs seems to be the use of spam filtering software. These software 
programs use sophisticated statistical measures to determine if incoming email 
messages are legitimate or if they are spam. They are imperfect, but by blocking a 
significant fraction of all spam email from ever reaching the readers’ eyes, the filters 
should reduce the positive response rate that spam advertisers see. Filters are designed 
to make false positives extremely unlikely, because a filter throwing away a valid 
message is several orders of magnitude worse than the filter letting spam email 
messages slip by. For this reason, filters are necessarily less effective than they could be.  
 Filtering software also has two intrinsic problems that are quite formidable. First, 
filtering software only works if users install it and use it. The adoption rate of filtering 
software has been disappointing, however. The average user apparently does not trust 
spam filters nor wish to spend time installing and configuring a filter. Second, spam 
filters encourage a virtual arms race between anti-spam developers and spam 
advertisers (Leung). Although some spam filters were extremely successful when they 
were first introduced, spam advertisers have found a number of ways to sneak emails 
past the filters. One tactic is to send an innocent, personal email with an advertising 
image attached. The text of the email sneaks it past the filter, then the user opens the 
message and sees the advertisement. Determining if attached images are spam-related 
is a difficult problem to solve in software. Some advertisers use random generators to 
transform normal English text into pseudo-English, by spuriously committing 
misspellings, inserting spaces in the middle of words, replacing letters with numbers 
that look similar, e.g. a 1 for a lower-case l (Goodman). Although spam filters can 
eventually respond to specific permutations of a word, there are so many permutations 




of common words that even sophisticated filters will continue to be outwitted by these 
simple tricks. 
 Fortunately, two promising methods should force spam advertisers to internalize 
the social and economic costs that they inflict on others. One approach uses direct 
economic disincentives to increase spam advertisers’ marginal costs. The other 
approach uses information about network context and some basic network theoretic 
analysis. The synthesis of these two methods reveals the combined power of network 
theory and economics; their deployment would result in the most effective deterrent to 
spam advertisers yet. Better yet, these techniques are more resistant to retaliation than 
previous techniques have been. 
 The economic disincentive technique is straightforward in concept but the 
implementation could be tricky. The basic idea is to tax every email some very small 
amount – some proposals suggest the term “micropayment.” The theory is that a very 
small percentage of email users generate a very large percentage of total emails. For the 
average user sending several hundred or thousand emails per year, the total cost would 
be at most only a few dollars. For spam advertisers sending millions of emails per year, 
however, the cost would be in the thousands or ten thousands. This slight increase in 
marginal costs would make most spam advertising ventures unprofitable. 
 At least two implementations are possible. In one possible implementation, ISPs 
would update their mail server software so that it demands a micropayment for putting 
mail into a user’s inbox on that server. Payments would be handled through pre-paid 
accounts that were debited by the micropayments in real-time. Large providers, such as 
Earthlink, AOL and MSN, would negotiate directly with each other to buy large blocks 
of credit. Smaller providers could use third party email brokers to buy standardized 
units of credit that were accepted by all major providers. The micropayment price 




would need to be set at such a level so as to deter spam but not to curtail legitimate 
usage of email. Each ISP would pass the costs of email transmission on to each user as a 
surcharge on that user’s monthly bill and in proportion to the amount of email that user 
sends. 
This implementation requires trust in the software to appropriately account for 
billions of micropayments, but open source software and a healthy market for 
information should prevent cheating. ISPs are expected to spontaneously adopt this 
implementation (if it is available and robust) because the small profit subsidizes 
increased overhead costs, and users will demand ISPs that can offer better spam 
prevention. Some implementation details are more problematic, such as how to tax an 
email that is routed through several email servers before reaching its destination. If each 
server taxed the same email equally, the micropayment system would have the 
unintended and undesirable consequence of excessively taxing email between far-flung 
nodes on the Internet. Dividing the micropayment equally among each server would be 
difficult because each server in the chain would need to know about all of the other 
servers, which is not how mail forwarding currently works. 
 The alternative implementation would be to allow end users to specify rates at 
which they accept mail from various sources. Each user would declare a set of prices 
and these prices would be stored on their local mail server. When another user wanted 
to send email to the first, his client software would query the remote server and 
determine the cost of sending the email. To make usage simple, senders would set a 
maximum on the prices they were willing to pay. If the cost exceeded that maximum, 
their email software would display the price and ask whether to continue. The 
micropayment scheme is more complex in this implementation – technology standards 
and universal adoption are imperative. The benefit is that users could set their price 




schedule differently for various users and groups on the Internet. Everybody on their 
list of family, close friends and colleagues could be made exempt from payment. 
Unknown addresses from trusted domains could be charged a small amount in 
proportion to the probability of receiving spam from a user in that domain. Larger 
amounts would be charged to users from unknown or suspicious domains. The use of a 
tiered price schedule is too complicated for the average user, but the process could be 
simplified by using a standard format and user-friendly software. It could be further 
simplified if consumer advocacy organizations made price schedule templates available 
online. In this way, novice users could base their price schedules on expert advice. 
 The user-centric implementation has a one major flaw. The micropayment 
management software would exhibit a positive network externality.ii Users would not 
buy in until most of their email contacts also had the software. The only solution would 
seem to be a major public relations campaign financed by major ISPs and the software 
providers. The network externality will have a tipping point, i.e. a threshold where 
consumption of the software is high enough that the externality suddenly becomes 
negligible. If ISPs deployed the software on their own servers, then a few major ISPs 
could tip the entire population towards the desired equilibrium. 
The micropayment model is immensely valuable for deterring spam, however, 
because spam advertisers will not be able to avoid paying for the true costs incurred by 
their spam email. The social and economic costs that they have been imposing on 
society will be internalized and for most spam advertisers the business model will be 
destroyed. 
A network-centric model proposed by Boykin & Roychowdhury is now 
presented. Combined with the micropayment model, this model will increase spam 
advertisers’ marginal costs even further. As a side benefit, the model demonstrates a 




synergistic relationship with current spam filtering software. The model is built on the 
idea that the structure of email networks conveys important information about the type 
of email transmitted on that network. In the global email network, each vertex 
represents an email address and an edge exists between any two addresses if they are 
both in the email header of the same message. (The email header is the part of the 
message that stores, among other things, the subject, the list of recipients, the carbon 
copies, blind carbons, etc.) Consider the following example: User A sends an email to 
user B, with Cc: to Users C and D. When B receives the message, he infers that A is 
connected to both C and D, but he also infers that C and D are connected to each other.  
Given a large volume of email, an extensive email network can be constructed. 
The information is localized to a specific user, so that the user only has an idea of the 
network context in which they are situated; the user knows very little of the overall 
email exchange graph structure. Given a user’s network context, however, Boykin & 
Roychowdhury demonstrate that most spam comes from certain subcomponents and 
most legitimate email comes from other subcomponents. Legitimate email never comes 
from a spam subcomponent, and spam email never comes from a legitimate 
subcomponent. Better yet, the types of these subcomponents can be distinguished using 
a handful of simple network theoretic tools. 
Email networks, like most social networks, have small diameter and high 
clustering. As was previously discussed, these types of properties seem to be rooted in 
the decentralized, spontaneous creation of the network. Subcomponents of the graph 
with high clustering coefficients can be assumed to have formed in such a manner. 
These subcomponents are therefore considered legitimate; users in these 
subcomponents can be safely whitelisted. Spam emails form a very different kind of 
subcomponent. Spam emails often have multiple recipients, and since spam advertisers 




share common lists of email addresses, spam emails are often sent to the same sets of 
email addresses, thus the graph of a spam subcomponent is bipartite. The clustering 
coefficient in these subcomponents is very near zero. Users in these subcomponents can 
safely be blacklisted. See Figure 3 for examples of a spam component and a legitimate 
subcomponent. The spam subcomponent is clearly bipartite, and the legitimate 
subcomponent shows significant clustering.  
  
Figure 3: Spam Component (left) and Legitimate Subcomponent (right),  
reprinted with permission (Boykin & Roychowdhury, 3). 
 
A test of this model proved it remarkably stable. Based on a data set of nearly 
5,500 archived email messages, Boykin & Roychowdhury were able to construct a 
network context and its corresponding whitelist and blacklist. Applied to an email 
archive compiled from one of the author’s actual inboxes, the algorithm correctly 
identified 53% of the messages as either spam or non-spam with 100% accuracy. The 
algorithm did not classify the remaining 47% into either category. The accuracy of this 
filter is amazing. To reiterate, false positives are several orders of magnitude worse than 




false negatives. This algorithm, however, does not sacrifice false negatives in order to 
reduce false positives.iii 
Two anomalies arise in this model. First, some subcomponents are so small that 
the clustering coefficient is unstable. Removing or adding a single edge would change 
the coefficient greatly. These subcomponents are not classified, and messages 
originating in these subcomponents comprise the 47% of emails that were not classified 
in the above experiment. The second anomaly occurs when a spam email happens by 
chance to include two recipients who belong to the same legitimate subcomponent. The 
algorithm then connects the spam subcomponent to the legitimate subcomponent, and 
the clustering coefficient becomes an intermediate value that is ambiguous. To resolve 
this situation, Boykin & Roychowdhury use a graph theoretic statistic called edge 
betweenness. This statistic, designed to measure the extent to which a particular edge 
bridges two communities in a graph, is computed by counting how many shortest paths 
between all pairs of vertices include that edge. By removing the edges with highest 
betweeness one at a time, the subcomponent will eventually break into two, smaller 
subcomponents. The process is repeated until subcomponents can be identified 
unambiguously as either spam or legitimate, or else they get so small as to be 
unclassifiable. 
Boykin and Roychowdhury also point out that their filter integrates well with 
statistically based, textual filters. Those kinds of filters need to be “trained” by being 
provided with example emails that are already classified as being either spam or 
legitimate. Many of these filters are trained first by the software developers, and then 
the end user tweaks the training by running the filter on some of his own personal 
email. Because the network-centric filter can positively identify over 50% of e-mail as 




either spam or legitimate, it can also provide a training set for a statistical filter as well, 
which takes the burden of training off of the end user. 
The combination of these two techniques represents a very new way of dealing 
with technological networks. In reality, technological networks are economic networks 
as well, because economics applies wherever there exists demand for scarce resources. 
At the same time, technological networks encode meaning into their own topologies. In 
the case of the global e-mail network, that meaning can be discerned by analyzing the 
network topology with a few simple statistics. Surprisingly, however, agents within a 
network rarely consider the topology of the network. In some cases, it is impossible to 
construct the entire network; even then, local topology is usually available. It is this 
network context that makes network theory very useful. An agent who can discern the 
structure of the network around him can use that information in powerful ways.  
 
IV. Internet Routing and Peering 
 Similar to many social and economic networks, the Internet has formed in a 
decentralized fashion. Currently the Internet comprises a number of autonomously 
managed networks, each known as an Autonomous System (AS). In order to provide 
connectivity for the Internet, autonomous systems must establish links to one another. 
Each link connects one autonomous system to another autonomous system, and there 
are two types of links possible: transit and peering. In a transit link regime, one 
autonomous system pays the other in proportion to the network traffic going over the 
link that originates from its own side and vice-versa. Transit link regimes are rare at 
high levels – between the largest providers – because measuring Internet traffic is a 
tedious task that requires a significant amount of overhead. Peering regimes are links 
between autonomous systems with no monetary exchange or traffic constraints.  




 This simple depiction of peering in the Internet ought to provide an intuition 
about Internet routing: there exists a perverse incentive to direct as much traffic to your 
neighbors as possible, since the marginal costs are nil. If there exists a fixed cost for 
maintaining a peering link, but no marginal cost for traffic over that link, then each 
autonomous system will exploit that link as much as possible.  
The autonomous system network is complete, i.e. there is at least one link 
between every autonomous system. If this were not the case, then that autonomous 
system would not be able to connect their users to every part of the Internet. When 
there are multiple links between a pair of autonomous systems, however, each 
autonomous system can exploit the placement of this link to their own advantage. The 
net result is that the overall performance of the Internet is lower than it could be if 
peering links were planned by a third party whose only interest was to maximize the 
Internet’s performance. Therefore, Internet routing can be conceived of as a planning 
problem. A variable of interest when analyzing planning problems is known as the price 
of anarchy, which is the ratio of total benefit under a centrally-planned regime to total 
benefit under a decentralized regime. The price of anarchy is a concept that tries to 
capture the magnitude of dead-weight loss that results from selfishness. Numerous 
papers have analyzed the price of anarchy in Internet peering, and estimates of 
inefficiencies range from 33% to 80% (e.g. Roughgarden, 9). 






Figure 4: An example peering configuration. 
 
 A quick graphical example will demonstrate how peering links are exploited. In 
Figure 4, each cloud represents a single autonomous system. Each black box represents 
a router, and lines between routers indicate network connections. There are two peering 
links between AS1 and AS2. Suppose that the router in AS1 which is circled wants to 
send a packet of data to the router in AS2 which is circled. The distance to the top link is 
only two hops: the data packet only goes through two routers before jumping into AS2. 
The distance to the bottom link is 4 hops, however. All other things being equal, it takes 
longer to get a packet to the bottom link than to the top link. Since each hop requires 
bandwidth and processing resources, AS1 will enforce a routing policy that always 
forwards packets from the circled router to the top link. 
 This policy is inefficient from a global perspective, because when the packet 
enters AS2 it takes six hops to reach its destination. In total, the packet traveled eight 
hops, but if AS1 had sent the packet on the bottom link, it would have taken six hops to 
reach its destination. Therefore, AS1’s selfish routing policy leads to a 33% dead-weight 
loss versus the globally optimal solution. This loss is the price of anarchy; by forgoing 




centralized planning and instead allowing self-interested, rational actors to determine 
an equilibrium outcome, the global outcome is inefficient. It is also important to note 
that not only is this outcome inefficient in the global sense, but one autonomous system 
shoulders most of the cost. 
 The above example is contrived to an extent because it imposes an unlikely 
network topography onto each autonomous system. This was only done for 
simplification, however. In reality, routers and connections between routers are not 
made equal. In fact, since the infrastructure of an autonomous system is developed over 
time in an iterative process, it is guaranteed that some routers are capable of handling 
more traffic than others and some connections have more bandwidth than others. Each 
autonomous system will have an incentive to route traffic away from these weak spots; 
otherwise, they would need to spend money upgrading the equipment to handle the 
increased load. Therefore, autonomous systems all use a routing policy called “nearest 
exit.” The idea is to forward the packet to the neighboring autonomous system using as 
little of their own resources as possible. This routing policy is also called “hot potato” – 
referring to the fact that autonomous systems want to hold on to data traffic for as short 
a time as possible. 
 Unfortunately, the solution to selfish peering in the Internet is not easy. 
Centralized planning is neither feasible nor appealing. If the problem is construed as a 
tragedy of the commons, then the Coase Theorem applies: declare property rights and 
an efficient outcome necessarily results. But the Coase Theorem does not guarantee an 
equalitarian outcome, and assigning property rights to shared links would be arbitrary 
and unfair. Ideally, autonomous systems would be forced to internalize costs by 
switching to transit regimes and paying fees for bandwidth induced on interdomain 
links. As mentioned above, this solution is generally infeasible for large providers 




because of the sheer volume of data flowing along these links. The overhead required to 
track the amount of data coming and going currently outweighs the cost savings. 
 Technology tends to get more powerful and less expensive at the same time, so 
that transit regimes may become feasible in the future. The question that remains is 
whether the feasibility of transit regimes will encourage autonomous system behavior 
that results in the globally desired outcome. There are two types of loss incurred in the 
current peering regime: the global loss in efficiency and the potential costs incurred by 
unequal usage of the peering link. To this end, Corbo and Petermann model 
interdomain linking in game theoretic terms. The two autonomous systems are players 
in a repeated game. Each autonomous system has a network that it would like to 
connect to the other autonomous system’s network. There is a very high penalty for 
being disconnected. Each autonomous system pays costs for the amount of traffic on 
their network, as well for the maintenance of the interdomain link. On each turn, one 
autonomous system randomly decides to propose either adding a link or removing a 
link. If the link is acceptable to both autonomous systems then it is added. Either 
autonomous system can unilaterally remove a link. 
 Corbo and Petermann applied this game theoretic model to networks that are 
similar to small world networks. They used a generative model called preferential 
attachment, which results in networks that have small diameter and heavy-tailed 
degree distribution but almost no clustering. They found that the number of peering 
links is very sensitive to the price of peering links; the number of links established 
vanishes rapidly as the price rises. Although the equilibria are robust to differences in 
size between the two autonomous systems, they are very sensitive to asymmetries in 
traffic flow between the two. 




We note a paucity of stochastically stable peering configurations under 
asymmetric conditions, particularly to unequal interdomain flow, with 
adverse effects on system-wide efficiency. The volatility of peering 
relationships in the face of perceived asymmetries suggests that peering 
will become increasingly rare as traffic and cost monitoring become more 
accurate and available. (Corbo & Petermann, 6) 
 
Although research in this area is ongoing, these early results indicate that as technology 
provides the tools to make transit regimes feasible, autonomous systems should 
spontaneously adopt them. As a side effect, transit regimes will bring about the globally 
desired effect of improving overall latency and resource utilization. This result follows 
from the Coase theorem: transit regimes declare property rights and the efficient 
outcome necessarily results. Like the spam email problem, selfish peering in the internet 
demonstrates the need for an economic point of view on technological problems. 
 
V. Graphical Economics 
 Graphical economics is the study of economic interactions in the context of graph 
theory. Generally, this means that economic interactions are constrained by the 
topology of the graph. For example, two economic agents can exchange only if they 
have an edge between them, or trade between two markets is allowed only if they have 
an edge between them. These constraints are not necessarily arbitrary either. Most 
classical economic models can be construed as taking place on a graph that is complete, 
i.e. a graph where every vertex is directly connected to every other vertex. Therefore, 
those classical economic models are actually just a special case of graphical economics. 
Since graph theory and network theory are so closely related, it makes sense to co-opt 
graphical economics into network economics. In fact, the main difference between 
graphical economics and network economics is that graphical economics is 
unconcerned with topology. Network economics projects an expected topology onto a 




graph, such as the small world topology. With this slight distinction in mind, the terms 
network and graph will be used interchangeably in this section. 
 Modeling economic problems on incomplete networks makes intuitive sense. 
Consider an economy consisting of multiple, disparate marketplaces. In order to buy or 
sell in one of these marketplaces, an agent must physically go to that marketplace. 
Those agents clearly pay a cost for each market they visit, yet as they visit more markets 
they have a wider range of other agents to buy or sell from. Intuitively, there ought to 
be an equilibrium that balances the benefit of participating in multiple marketplaces 
with the costs of monitoring those marketplaces. The same principle applies in a more 
familiar setting: an individual interested in buying a particular good is only willing to 
go to a handful of stores to find the lowest price. Therefore, there is a limited amount of 
connectivity between producers and consumers, and local variations in price should 
result. 
The first graphical economic problem to be considered is the “brain-dead” model 
of exchange (Kearns, 17). Each vertex represents an economic agent and an edge 
between two agents represents the ability for them to exchange. All agents begin with 
an initial endowment. At each time step, every agent divides his wealth equally among 
all of his neighbors and distributes it to them. At the same time, therefore, each agent 
also collects a small payment from each his neighbors. Regardless of the topology of the 
network and the distribution of initial endowments, this model always converges to a 
predicable, static equilibrium. The percentage of the overall wealth possessed at each 
vertex is equal to the ratio of that vertex’s degree over the total number of edges in the 
network.  








Figure 5: Two examples of network topology. 
 
As a simple example, consider the first of the two network topologies presented 
in Figure 5. Imagine that agents A, B and C have initial endowments of 3, 2 and 1 
respectively. In the first time period, agent A will distribute 1.5 to B and 1.5 to C. B will 
distribute 1 to A and 1 to C, etc. At the end of the first time period, A, B and C will have 
1.5, 2 and 2.5 respectively. Aggregate wealth obviously remains the same, but disparity 
decreases: initially the wealthiest node A controlled half of the wealth, but after one 
time period the wealthiest node controls only 42% of the aggregate wealth. After 
another time period, A, B and C will have 2.25, 2 and 1.75, and the wealthiest node only 
controls 38% of the aggregate wealth. After a few more iterations, the wealth 
distribution becomes nearly uniform. In the second network topology, the wealth 
distribution converges, but it converges to a non-uniform distribution. Specifically, A, B 
and C will have 1.5, 3 and 1.5 at equilibrium. 






Figure 6: A power law function. 
 
In this model, it pays to have a large number of neighbors relative to everybody 
else. The first network topology is complete: every vertex is connected to every other 
vertex. The result is a uniform distribution of wealth. In real life, economic networks are 
typically not complete; thus, local variations arise at equilibrium. If economic networks 
are constrained to be small world networks, then the wealth distribution at equilibrium 
takes on a more significant meaning. One of the key characteristics stipulated for small 
world networks is their heavy-tailed degree distribution. Network theorists use a 
function called a power law to model these degree distributions. A power law is a 
hyperbolic function of the form: 
€ 
f (x)= k / xα . Figure 6 visualizes this function for 
€ 
k = 1/ 2 and 
€ 
α = 1. This function is related to a number of naturally occurring 
distributions, as noted by George Zipf in Zipf’s law: income distribution, sizes of cities, 
and occurrence of words in large texts. Figure 7 confirms a Zipf distribution for GDP in 
the fifty wealthiest nations in the world. An informal comparison of the two figures 
reveals congruity. Connecting the top of each bar in Figure 7 to its adjacent bars traces a 
line just like the one in Figure 6. 
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Figure 7: Zipf Distribution for GDP. 
 
 Although this brain-dead exchange model is a drastic simplification of the 
complex dynamics of economic exchange, it has merit. The model describes a sort of 
socialism, where each individual produces as much as possible with the inputs he is 
given and then shares equally with all neighbors. In such a society, those who share 
more will get more back. 
 A better model is desirable, of course, and it is possible to adapt any general 
economics equilibrium model to a graphical model. Kakade, Kearns, and Ortiz 
demonstrate Arrow-Debreu equilibria on incomplete economic networks, i.e. networks 
where trade is constrained so that not all pairs of agents can trade directly with each 
other. Under roughly the same assumptions that Arrow-Debreu requires, they prove 
the existence of a general equilibrium for the graphical Arrow-Debreu. Another 




interesting result is that, like the brain-dead model presented above, the graphical 
Arrow-Debreu model allows for local variations in price.  
 In a general Arrow-Debreu model, there are a number of agents each with a 
specific initial endowment; there are also a number of goods that these agents have 
utility for. The price for each good is constant for all players. Each player sells his initial 
endowment and then uses that revenue to buy goods so as to maximize his utility. 
Assuming that agents’ utility functions are monotonically increasing, i.e. they generally 
prefer more of a good to less of it, then Arrow and Debreu show that there is a set of 
prices for which the market clears. That is, there exists a set of prices so that demand 
exactly equals supply. 
 The graphical Arrow-Debreu model proceeds in the same fashion, except that 
each agent is constrained to only buy from or sell to his neighbors in the network. In 
this case, the market clears at each vertex. That is, each vertex has each good supplied to 
it in exactly the quantity it demands, given the prices for each good. This local clearance 
condition guarantees, of course, a global market clearance as well. The only difference 
between the graphical Arrow-Debreu equilibrium and the classic is that the graphical 
model allows a different set of prices at each vertex.  
 Consider again the network topologies in Figure 5. iv In these markets, there are 
two goods. Agent A has linear utility for good 1 only, B has equal, linear utility for both 
goods, and C has linear utility for good 2 only. Agent A has an endowment of (1,2), B 
has (1,1) and C has (2,1). In the first network, a price set that establishes equilibrium is 
(1,1). At these prices, Agent A sells his endowment for 3, B sells his for 2, and C sells his 
for 3. Agent A ends up with a consumption bundle of (3,0), B has (1,1), and C has (0,3). 
The network is reproduced in Figure 8 with annotations indicating the equilibrium 
outcome. Notice that a single set of prices clears the market because the graph is 




complete. In other words, the graphical equilibrium in the first network is a general 
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium as well. This result is expected because the classical Arrow-
Debreu is just a special case of the graphical Arrow-Debreu, and the first network 
















Figure 8: Equilbrium outcomes in two different networks. 
 
The second network is not complete, however, and given the same utility 
functions and endowments the equilibrium is quite different. In fact, the only way to 
clear the market globally is for each agent to charge a different set of prices for the 
goods. In equilibrium, Agent A charges (2,1) for goods 1 and 2, respectively, B charges 
(2,2), and C charges (1,2). Now B sells his initial endowment for 4, while A and C sell 
their endowments for 3 each. Agent A ends up with a consumption bundle of (2,0), B 
has (2,2), and C has (0,2). Compared to the first network, agent B has doubled his 
consumption of each good, which comes at the expense of agents A and C who each 
lose a unit of consumption. Therefore, agent B has profited by acting like a broker to 
agents A and C, who had mutually desirable endowments but were unable to trade 
directly with each other. This scenario comports with the real-world reality of imperfect 
information. If a buyer and seller cannot find each other, a third party can profit by 
buying from one and selling to the other. Therefore, incomplete information, which 




creates incomplete trading graphs, can lead to local price variations. This is an intuitive 
result that is powerfully confirmed by this example.  
 Kakade et. al. compute a graphical equilibrium for a larger network (7) and find 
that price variations arise, with highly connected vertices tending to have a higher 
utility than others. Unlike the brain-dead model, however, utility is not directly 
correlated to degree. Instead, other subtle factors affect utility. A vertex that has only a 
few neighbors can have a high utility if those neighbors do not have any other 
neighbors of their own. In that case, the vertex profits by having a captive market for its 
goods – essentially a monopoly. Intuitively, we might also expect that clusters will 
demonstrate local minima of prices because of the high degree of competition and 
vertices with high betweenness stand to profit from arbitrage; these results have not 
been proven yet. 
 Calculating graphical equilibria is quite complex, especially for very large 
graphs. These calculations suffer from combinatorial explosion, a mathematical term 
which refers to the fact that the possible combinations of buyer and seller becomes huge 
when there are only a few hundred vertices in the graph. Kakade et al. in their 2004 
paper propose an algorithm called ADProp that scales exponentially with the number 
of edges in the graph. A small increase in the number of edges results in a huge increase 
in the running time of the algorithm. ADProp scales polynomially with the number of 
vertices, however, which is a big improvement over previous, non-graphical algorithms 
(Kakade, et al., 13). Algorithms that solve these problems tend to use iterative methods 
that achieve rough solutions very quickly and then slowly converge to the true minima 
by minimizing an error term. Iterative algorithms sometimes fail to find the true 
minimum, converging to a local minimum instead. Although imperfect, iterative 
algorithms are still desirable because they make computer experiments feasible. 




Augmenting traditional economic equilibrium models with network theoretic 
constraints and computer experiments permits new insights. Specifically, the local 
variation in prices reflects the reality of incomplete information better than classical 
models do. Also, graphical economics may provide insight into inequities in wealth 
distribution. The next section demonstrates the application of network economics to a 
practical case study, with the intention of understanding how network structure affects 
wealth. 
 
VI. International Trade 
 The principles of network economics are applicable to a broad range of real-
world problems. One interesting network that has attracted previous research is the 
network of international trade partners (e.g. Kakade, et al., 7-8). In this paper, the 
international trade network is defined as follows: every nation or semi-autonomous 
region (Hong Kong, for example) that reported any trade in the year 2004 is a vertex in 
the network. An edge exists between any two vertices for which the aggregate trade 
between the two exceeds some threshold k. Adjusting k up or down affects the edge 
density of the network, so in order to yield an informative but manageable data set I 
have selected k=$1bn.  
 The data for this network was extracted from the United Nations Statistics 
Divisions’ Comtrade Database. This database provides (self-reported) data on the 
amount of trade between nations measured in thousands of U.S. dollars. The dataset 
has some ambiguities that impede rigorous statistical analysis. Some countries’ reports 
conflict; for instance, Albania reports imports from Algeria totaling 179,761,000 but 
Algeria does not report any exports to Albania. Therefore, aggregating trade data is 
error-prone, but the resulting network should still be meaningful. 




 The network was extracted using a custom java application that tracks all import 
and export records and sums their values for each pair of countries. The application 
then outputs the network in the dot format, a file format for network graphs that is 
useful for rendering graph visualizations. At a threshold of k=$1bn, the resulting 
network has 237 nodes and 993 edges. This graph is complex enough to defy the 
method of visual inspection used in Section V. Figure 9 is a high-level visualization of 
the network. If this visualization was enlarged enough to be readable, the visualization 
would be twenty feet square. Even at this small size, it is possible to discern the 
existence of perhaps thirty to forty highly connected nodes where a number of edges 
cross and form a dark black star. Also, the layout algorithm used to render this network 
visualization tries to place central nodes towards the middle of the diagram.v Otherwise, 
the visualization is far too small to be useful. Statistical analysis and analysis of specific 
subcomponents will be necessary to infer meaningful information from this graph.   





Figure 9: High-level Visualization of the Global Trade Network, k=$1bn. 
 
First, it will be useful to determine whether this international trade network 
conforms to the properties of a small world network. Recall that “small world” implies 
that a network has small diameter, high clustering, and heavy-tailed degree 
distribution. The term has nothing to do with the fact that the network at hand is based 
on international trade. These three characteristics are only very meaningful for a 




connected graph; therefore, the first step in this analysis is to remove all vertices with 
degree zero from the graph. This leaves a connected graph with 131 vertices and 993 
edges. The diameter is computed with Floyd’s algorithm and the clustering coefficient 





∑   (Eq. 1) 
In this equation, g is the graph for which we are computing the clustering coefficient 
C(g). For each node n in the graph g, the ratio of the actual number of edges yn 
connecting n’s neighbors to each other is divided by the total possible number of edges 
that could exist between n’s neighbors. Then the clustering coefficients are averaged 
across all nodes to find the clustering coefficient for the graph. The data for the 
connected component of the international trade graph are given in Table 1. The 
diameter is very small and the clustering coefficient is very high – the characteristic 
small world qualities. The maximum possible clustering coefficient is 1.0, which occurs 
only when the graph is complete. As a comparison, Duncan Watts reports that the 
clustering coefficient of the neural network of C. Elegans is 0.28 and the coefficient for 





Clustering Coefficient .59 
Mean Degree 15.2 
Median Degree 6 
 
Table 2: Global Trade Network Statistics. 

































































Figure 10: Degree Distribution. 
 
The degree distribution of the connected component of the international trade 
graph is presented in Figure 10. For each bin, the graph shows the number of countries 
in that bin. For instance, in the 1-5 bin, there are over 60 countries, but in the 6-10 bin 
there are just over 10 countries. This degree distribution clearly shows a significantly 
heavy-tailed degree distribution. The U.S.A. and Germany are the top two, with 
degrees of 84 and 74, respectively. Intuitively, it makes sense that two nations known 
for heavy industry should have numerous significant trade links. This data supports the 
conclusion that the international trade network displays distinct small world 
characteristics.  
 The next mode of inquiry is to look at interesting subcomponents of the graph, 
such as areas of the graph that have free trade agreements. Two prime examples are the 
European Union (EU) and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The 




network visualizations for these two countries are presented in Figure 11 and Figure 12. 
The European Union trade network has twenty-three vertices and one hundred thirty-
six edges. The ASEAN trade network has eight nodes and nine edges. Two nations in 
the ASEAN are disconnected.  
 EU ASEAN 
Nodes 23 8 
Edges 136 9 
Diameter 1.41 1.17 
Clustering Coefficient .799 .678 
Mean Degree 11.8 3.00 
Median Degree 13 3 
 
Table 3 summarizes the key statistics for the EU trade network and for the connected 
component of the ASEAN trade networks. 
 
 EU ASEAN 
Nodes 23 8 
Edges 136 9 
Diameter 1.41 1.17 
Clustering Coefficient .799 .678 
Mean Degree 11.8 3.00 
Median Degree 13 3 
 
Table 3: Network Statistics for EU & ASEAN Trade Networks 
  
The clustering coefficient for both of these free trade areas is very high, which 
could be a result of the economic incentive to trade provided by free trade agreements. 
The diameters are roughly equal, but because the ASEAN is a much smaller network 
the small diameter is not surprising. The EU’s diameter is significantly small, however, 
considering that there are twenty-three vertices. The degree distributions for these two 




networks are presented in Figure 13. The distributions are nearly flat, not heavy-tailed 
like small world networks. Degree seems to decrease linearly with decreasing rank, 
implying perhaps that those nations who entered into these free trade regions already 
belonged to the same economic class, where each nation’s trade was constrained to be 
in the same order of magnitude as the other member nations.  
 
Figure 11: Visualization of the EU Trade Network. 














































Figure 13: Degree Distributions of the EU and ASEAN Trade Networks. 
 
The final analysis compares how degree affects GDP. For the twenty-three EU 
nations, the GDP per capita for each member state has been plotted against both that 
state’s degree in the international trade network and that state’s degree in the EU trade 




network. In Figure 14, the vertical axis on the left measures the degree of a state in the 
international trade network; the vertical axis on the right measures the degree of the 
state in the EU trade network. The black dots represent degree in the international trade 
network and gray dots represent degree in the EU trade network. GDP per capita is 
reported in thousands of U.S. dollars. Interestingly enough, there is almost no 
correlation between GDP per capita and degree. The scatter plot shows a least-squares 
regression linear fit; the coefficient of the GDP per capita term is almost zero, implying 
a very weak or nonexistent correlation. The r-squared term indicates that GDP has very 
little explanatory power for degree.  
 
GDP Per Capita vs. Degree for EU Nations
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Figure 14: Correlating GDP to Degree. 
 
Removing Luxembourg, the obvious outlier in the bottom right corner of the 
scatter plot, increases the r-squared term to .35. This result comports with the 




conclusions from the graphical Arrow-Debreu model in Section V: in an economic 
exchange network, degree is a significant but not comprehensive predictor of wealth. 
The law of comparative advantage states that each country should concentrate on 
producing only those goods in which they are comparatively efficient and acquire the 
rest of the goods they need through trade. Intuitively, the law of comparative 
advantage and free trade should result in higher wealth for countries that trade more, 
because they use their labor more efficiently that way. In other words, wealth should be 
partially correlated to high degree. This simple analysis is insufficient to determine the 
direction of causality, but degree and wealth are correlated. 
 




VIII. Closing Remarks 
There are several important themes brought out by the case studies in this paper. 
For one, it has become clear that many technological systems would benefit by the 
application of economic principles. Spam email and Internet routing are just two 
examples. In general, whenever many users are competing for scarce resources, 
economic principles will apply. When local incentives are perverse, the global 
equilibrium will be inefficient. When designing systems such as the next Internet 
protocol or the next email protocol, designers need to consider how the local payoffs to 
each user will be crafted in order to promote the ideal global equilibrium. This is a 
familiar problem for economists, the social planner problem, and it is well understood 
and thoroughly researched. 
At the same time, network theory is providing new tools for economists. As 
stated above, network economics is really just a generalization of classical equilibrium 
models. It is an intuitive generalization, however, and it yields more realistic results 
than previous models without adding unnecessary complication. One important 
conclusion is that network topology affects the nature of economic outcomes. By 
imposing various network topologies that resemble real world economic networks, we 
can understand how information and connectedness affect market activity and wealth. 
Additionally, network economics can help explain what happens as the edge 
density of an economic network increases. Links are established in economic networks 
by information: the more markets one can surveil, the greater bargaining power he has. 
The modern era is characterized by an ever-growing stream of information. Shopping 
on the Internet, for instance, allows consumers to make track prices across many more 
suppliers than was previously feasible. By creating more links between consumers and 
producers, information increases the edge density of the network. As a result, price 




variation should drop. This conclusion is supported directly in the Arrow-Debreu 
model. 
Computational experiments should be a major focus for network economics in 
the near future. Because of complexity issues, progress will be made most quickly by 
running simulations of economic models on various network topologies and measuring 
how various outcomes correlate to various network statistics such as diameter, 
clustering, and degree distribution. Hopefully, a deeper understanding of network 
economic interactions can be developed. This knowledge would be useful both in 
business – to study profit making opportunities – but also in public policy. With an 
understanding of network structure and its relationship to information and economic 
outcomes, public policy can focus on how best to inform consumers.
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Endnotes 
                                                       
i E.g. http://www.mail-abuse.com/lookup.html or http://www.spews.org/ 
 
ii Once again, network externalities imply a different meaning for network than I am 
generally intending in this paper. A positive network externality simply means that a 
good becomes more desirable as others’ consumption of it increases. E.g., I am more 
likely to purchase Microsoft Word because everybody else uses it; I might value the 
program itself below its competitors but the desire to be as compatible as possible 
overrides that valuation. 
 
iii The whitelist and blacklist in this model are much more versatile than those currently 
in use. In order to contact Boykin & Roychowdhury to request permission to reprint 
their diagrams, I sent Boykin an e-mail with a Cc: to Roychowdhury, and the network-
centric model infers that my email is legitimate simply because I emailed them both 
simultaneously. Boykin’s filter sees that I am connected to Roychowdhury because his 
email address and my email address are in the same header. Therefore, Boykin can be 
confident that the message is not spam, even though I am a perfect stranger to him and 
we likely do not have any common acquaintances. If Boykin had a static whitelist (like 
most in use today), I would have difficulty reaching him by email without 
communicating by some other medium first. 
 
iv This example is based on an example presented in Kakade, et al., 6-7. 
 
v See http://www.graphviz.org/ for more information about the visualization software. 
